In Stephanie v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Massachusetts HMO Blue, Inc., No. 16-1997 (1st Cir. 2017), the plaintiff, Stephanie C. (“Stephanie”), was continuing to seek reimbursement under an ERISA covered plan (the “Plan”) for certain medical expenses connected with the treatment of her teenage son, M.G. The plan administrator, defendant Blue Cross Blue Shield of Massachusetts HMO Blue, Inc. (“BCBS”), denied the portions of her claim that are now in dispute. The district court, reviewing the denial de novo, upheld BCBS’s action. Stephanie appeals.
Upon reviewing the case, the First Circuit Court of Appeals (the “Court”) said that an ERISA plan-such as the Plan here- is a form of contract. Thus, contract-law principles inform the construction of an ERISA plan, and the plain language of the Plan provisions should normally be given effect. Seen in this light, the dispositive issue here is not whether M.G.’s course of treatment at Gateway was beneficial to him but, rather, whether that course of treatment was covered under the Plan. Applying the plain language of the Plan, the Court held that the clear weight of the evidence dictates a finding that the disputed medical charges were not medically necessary (as defined by the Plan) and, thus, were not covered. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court’s decision.